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Traditional approaches to the study of financial crises typically involve an elucidation of 
causation. Meanwhile, this project seeks to take an original approach in analysing how the 
circumstances of a relatively minor crisis, namely that in the United Kingdom in 1976, can 
have long-term effects on an economy by eliciting changes in the trajectory of policy 
formation. Given the importance of the development of North Sea oil to contemporary 
international perception of Britain’s ability to meet future balance of payments obligations, 
this project focuses on policy decisions pertaining to this domain. Through an extension of the 
narrative approach frequently adopted in the study of financial crises, this project finds that 
the crisis of 1976 had significant implications for the development of North Sea oil in two 
respects. It undermined the practical clout of the recently formed national oil company 
(BNOC), making it a vessel with political rights it was unlikely to be able to realise. Further 
to this, it set a precedent in terms of considering the sale of public assets as ‘negative 
expenditure’ as opposed to revenue when it agreed to the sale of £500 million in British 
Petroleum (BP) shares in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). Nonetheless, this project concludes that it 
was political division within and between parties that both stimulated the crisis and resulted in 














As the consequences of economic malaise emerge in the aftermath of a financial crisis, 
academics, government officials and economic agents alike engage in a retrospective 
diagnosis of the symptoms of a system tending toward self-destruction. The critical avenue of 
analysis often becomes the identification of a narrative of causation (Kindleberger and Aliber 
2011, Reinhardt and Rokoff 2009, specifically for the subprime crisis Brunnermeier 2009), as 
well as attempting to enact a programme for recovery and reform (Baldwin and Giavazzi 
2015, for the Euro-Zone crisis). In an attempt to shift the focus of inquiry, this work will 
focus on the consequences of financial crisis, namely how they were directly caused by the 
state of crisis but contributed to longer-term policy decisions that endured beyond effects 
typically associated with financial crises. The crisis under analysis is that in Britain in 1976, 
which in certain respects gave the impression of greater upheaval than the aftermath would 
suggest was warranted. Sterling declined over a nine-month period before agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the largest loan issued to date assured financial 
markets that the budget-constrained course the British government had embarked upon was 
fiscally sound, as well as dissuading speculators from engaging in opportunistic action.  The 
funding made available was never taken out in full, and repayments were made in a timely-
manner. The sentiment of crisis seemed to dissipate as rapidly as it struck. 
Nonetheless, decisions taken during this nine-month period had the potential to have longer-
lasting implications for the British economy. By virtue of being under intense international 
observation, as well as subjected to scrutiny by the IMF the British government was 
constrained in their decision-making and forced to make choices that would present their 
finances in the strongest possible light. This work investigates such choices in the context of 
North Sea oil development. The development of North Sea oil was a highly capital-intensive 
activity and contributed to Britain’s chronic balance of payments deficit due to the value of 
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imports of equipment required. It was, however, also the beginning to generate revenue for 
the British economy, and frequently cited as the industry that would banish concerns over 
balance of payments by the end of the decade. This work thus analyses the extent to which the 
financial crisis of 1976 had a damaging impact on policy governing what was to a certain 
extent viewed as the very resource that would determine Britain’s economic salvation. The 
findings are that concerns over the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) led to two 
decisions influenced by the method of accounting of this item. The first was in limiting the 
definition of ‘participation’ of the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC). Any capital 
expenditure or financing for a nationalised industry was included in the PSBR. Due to the 
high cost of development of oil fields, the British Government felt BNOC could not guarantee 
capital contribution to the fields it participated in, since this would result in a drastic increase 
in PSBR in the coming years. The precedent was thus set of BNOC as an institution with 
privilege and limited practical power. The second decision was that of the sale of £500 
million worth of BP shares. An accident of accounting led to revenue generated by this sale 
being regarded as negative expenditure and constituting a reduction in the PSBR. A second 
precedent was set: the privatisation of state assets would be accounted for as a decrease in the 
borrowing requirement. Both these seemingly pragmatic decisions would have significant 
effects on the trajectory of the development of North Sea oil. 
This paper has a rather different approach from the usual “work project format”. The 
hermeneutic power of the narrative is here mobilized to distil the causation and explanatory 
process to understand the long-term effects of the 1976 financial crisis. In this sense, it 
escalates the explanatory power of narratives in economics, as proposed by McCloskey 
(1983) and Morgan (2001). The argument is unfolded as follows: Section One outlines the 
origins of the crisis, exploring both the long-term and immediate causes, as well as the 
perspective of the IMF with respect to the state of the British economy. Section Two provides 
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an overview of the development of the North Sea up to 1976, making reference to the most 
significant oil fields to have been discovered. Section Three examines criticisms relating to 
North Sea oil policy beyond the scope of the crisis including the failure to negotiate an 
extended territorial boundary with Norway, mismanagement of licensing rounds and taxation 
policy, the neglect of the Offshore Supply industry and the lack of sovereign oil fund. These 
were all influenced by Britain’s protracted economic issues. Section Four examines the 
evidence for the contribution of the crisis in North Sea oil development, as well as analysing 
how the fractured political landscape interacted with the condition of crisis. 
 
1. The Origins of the Crisis 
i. The slow and steady decline of a Great Power 
The ailing British economy had suffered from a succession of crises in the post-war era. In 
part, these were warranted by the erosion of British fundamentals and the seemingly 
intractable economic woes that befell the nation at this time. Whilst the ‘Golden Era’ of 1950-
1973 might have been perceived to have been one of prosperity, it was in hindsight one of 
relative decline. For example, although West Germany and France respectively had a GDP 
per person of 61.7 per cent and 71.4 per cent of that of the UK in 1950, by 1973 they had 
superseded the U.K in this metric by 9.3 and 6.6 per cent, respectively. This change is largely 
accounted for by the slower growth of labour productivity in Britain, which was 3 percentage 
points below that of West Germany between 1950 and 1973, and 2 percentage points below 
that of France (Crafts, 2017). Meanwhile, Britain had committed politically to a social 
programme involving high levels of public expenditure in the post-war period (Timmins, 
2017). Whilst this was not unlike other European nations at the time, what was alarming was 
the extent to which public expenditure was coming to account for an increasing proportion of 
British GDP, in particular when compared to the relative expenditure of other countries. 
 6 
Britain was showing signs of difficulty in meeting the programmes for social security and 
development it had promised the British people. For example, between 1945 and 1976, there 
had only been one year in which there had been a budget surplus rather than deficit (Bank of 
England, 1983). Net borrowing as a percentage of GDP was growing, estimated to be at 11 
per cent for 1975-6 (IMF Archives, 1976). Unemployment was on the rise from 
approximately 2 per cent in 1950, to 5.4 per cent in 1975, with no signs that this trend would 
be abated in the near future (Layard and Nickell, 1986).  Additionally, after only mild 
inflationary pressures in two decades following the war, the early years of the 1970s saw an 
unanticipated and inexplicable increase (Coopey and Woodward, 1996). In part, this may 
have been related to the oil crisis of 1973-4, whereby oil prices spiked as a result of the 
politically motivated embargo stimulated by the Yom Kippur war (De Gregorio, 2007). 
However, at a time when most countries had engaged in deflationary policies and accepted a 
reduction to their living standards, Britain (as well as Italy) had continued with a Keynesian 
outlook, seeking to spend itself out of hardship. To a certain extent, this policy corresponded 
with the advice imparted by the IMF, which was critically concerned with preventing the 
episode culminating in a global recession (Roberts, 2016). Nonetheless, instead of initiating 
recovery, Britain succeeded only in baffling economists by precipitating a simultaneous boom 
and slump, or stagflation.  
By the beginning of 1974, in the wake of the oil crisis and facing industrial action by the coal 
miners, the emergency three-day week implemented by Prime Minister Edward Heath 
appeared indicative of a country on the brink of collapse. Following U-turn carried out by his 
government with regards to economic policy the Conservative party seemed politically 
discredited both in practise and principle. In February 1974, toward the end of Heath’s 
administration, the National Institute for Economic & Social Research would observe ‘It is 
not often that a government finds itself confronted with a possibility of a simultaneous failure 
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to achieve all four main policy objectives: adequate economic growth, full employment, a 
satisfactory balance of payments, and reasonable, stable prices’ (Bogdanor, 2016 p.1). 
National discontent had set the stage for an incoming Labour administration, albeit forming a 
minority government. Thus, long-term economic variables suggested there was reasonable 
cause for external observers to have concern over the trajectory of the British economy.  
ii. Sterling crisis  
Britain’s vulnerability to international perception of its economic and political stability was 
heightened by sterling’s residual status as a reserve currency. This reality made it more 
challenging for the Bank of England to defend sterling at a certain rate of exchange (Schnek, 
1994). For decades Britain had struggled to maintain its pegged parity with the US dollar, 
despite significant devaluations in both 1949 and 1967. Britain had experienced numerous 
crises in the three decades following the end of the Second World War: ‘By this time a lot of 
people were fed up with sterling crises’ Scott Pardee of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York recollected (Burk and Cairncross, 1992 p.38). After the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreement in August 1971, Britain had adopted a pegged parity of $2.60 under the 
Smithsonian agreement. However, ongoing difficulties in maintaining this rate had led to 
Anthony Barber, Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, to float the currency in June 1972 
(Oliver and Hamilton, 2007). Whilst the continued depreciation of sterling did not necessarily 
constitute a currency crisis, the Bank of England still maintained a policy of intervention 
when the value of sterling declined at a rate they perceived to be excessively severe or not 
reflective of economic fundamentals. 
The financial crisis of 1976 was in essence a sterling crisis characterised by prolonged and 
seemingly excessive decline of the currency.  The first signs of distress became apparent on 
Thursday 4th March when sterling dropped one percent. Richard Roberts (2016) attributes 
this to a mishandling of a routine operation on the part of the Bank of England. The Nigerian 
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government had requested a conversion of a proportion of their sterling balances, which was 
to be carried out via an exchange with the Bank of England for UK foreign currency reserves. 
In order to replenish reserves, the Bank of England would subsequently sell an equivalent 
amount of sterling to the market. By Roberts’ account, the execution of this phase of the 
process was mismanaged and the action was perceived as deliberate intervention to make 
sterling more competitive. Potential buyers of sterling made themselves scarce. Hickson 
(2005) contributes to the narrative by assessing the decision of the Bank of England to cut 
interest rates the following day, questioning whether this was therefore, as markets suspected, 
part of a broader policy to depreciate sterling. Despite Denis Healey’s account (the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer) distancing himself from the episode and referring to the two measures as 
mistakes on the part of the Bank of England, Hickson’s less absolving conclusion is that 
Healey would have most likely have been aware of the measures, but that their intention 
might have been to prevent further appreciation rather than to stimulate depreciation.  
Such a decline was compounded by two particularly notable political events that shook the 
confidence of the market in the trajectory of the British economy. On the 10th March the 
House of Commons rejected a White Paper, published in the afternoon of 19th February, 
outlining cuts in public expenditure amounting to £1.6 billion beginning in the years 1977-8. 
Whilst the emerging consensus within the House of Commons seemed to support the notion 
that such cuts were if anything overdue, a left-wing contingent of the Labour party abstained 
from voting due to opposition to this economic strategy, resulting in the defeat of the 
proposition. Burk and Cairncross (1992) note that the market would thus witness a 
government undermined by its own backbench when it came to the issue of public 
expenditure cuts. Although a vote of confidence reversed much of the damage triggered by 
this particular occurrence, no sooner had the dust settled than a surprise resignation by the 
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Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, on 16th March induced alarm in the markets once 
more. 
 
Figure 1: Historic inflation and USD/GBP Exchange rate, Source: IMF  
Despite being typically recognised as the beginning of the 1976 crisis, marking the onset of 
the depreciation in sterling that was to progress over the coming months, application to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan would not be announced until 29th September. 
In the interim, Britain had successfully secured $5.3 billion in credit from the Group of Ten, 
comprised of Western democratised nations that agreed to facilitate the IMF’s lending from 
1962 onwards, on the condition that if they could not repay their withdrawing from this 
provision by the 7th December of that year, they would have to negotiate with the IMF for 
further funds (Roberts, 2016). Official documents indicate that for weeks prior to the 
announcement the government had recognised this as highly probable and were 
contemplating the optimal approach to the organisation: ‘The $5.3 billion standby credit 
which we secured at the beginning of June has barely given us breathing space’ began an 
account of the economic situation published in the cabinet papers from 13th July 1976. 
However, it would appear that it was the sudden drop in the value of sterling on 28th 
September, that would underscore the urgency of taking these steps. It was this news that 
notoriously prompted Healey’s volte-face from Heathrow airport; an image that would remain 
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ingrained on popular imagination as reflecting the desperate and fragile state of the national 
economy (Roberts, 2016). 
iii. The position of the IMF 
What was perhaps most remarkable about the crisis was the extent to which it seemed short-
lived and superficial. After announcing the approval of the IMF for standby credit in 
December, sterling rapidly recovered and remained stable through-out 1977. Confidential 
documents in the IMF archive reveal that already in July 1976 members of the Executive 
Board had a nuanced appreciation of the reality of the British economy and could discern that 
the markets were responding in an overly pessimistic manner. For example, Mr Ryrie, UK 
Executive Director of the IMF, emphasised that ‘the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement in 
the United Kingdom was a wider concept than is in use in most countries and cannot be 
directly compared with concepts of surplus or deficit elsewhere’ (IMF Archives,1976 
76/116). Furthermore, not only did he note that the government had already committed to 
public expenditure cuts but that they had introduced cash limits as a technique for controlling 
it. ‘The new measures will clearly mean there will be a fall in public expenditure in real terms 
in 1977/78’ (IMF Archives,1976 76/116) he concluded. In fact, the IMF had raised their 
forecast for GDP growth for 1976 in the midst of the crisis. Mr. Whitelaw, Australian 
Executive to the IMF, ‘was pleased… that the economy was on the road to recovery; the rate 
of inflations had fallen, the current account position had improved, and the level of exports 
seemed to be increasing’ (IMF Archives,1976 76/116). Several mentions of the imminent 
ramping up of North Sea oil production were made yet concerns over both the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement and the poor performance of nationalised industries such as the 
British Steel Corporation were also raised. Neither of these boded well for the fledgling 
national oil corporation, BNOC, and the political hope of establishing greater public control 
over North Sea Assets.  
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2. The Discovery and Development of North Sea Oil 
Accounts of the North Sea Oil seldom fail to make reference to Prime Minister James 
Callaghan’s assertion in 1977 that ‘God has given Britain her best opportunity for one 
hundred years in the shape of North Sea oil’ (Shepherd, 2015). Similarly, in the wake of the 
issuing of Britain’s largest IMF loan to date, the headline of the Financial Times 
optimistically directed the future of British finance ‘From the IMF to the North Sea’ (Lex: 
Financial Times, 1977). This confidence in recovery due to the development of North Sea oil 
might have seemed out of place with the progress thus far made toward the recovery of the 
resource. It had been discussed within Parliament that the expected royalties from oil for the 
year ending 31st March 1976 stood at only £0.3 million (Hansard Historic, 1976a).  
Whilst the onshore production of oil had been an earlier development in the United Kingdom, 
exploration of the North Sea began only after significant Dutch discoveries, including that of 
the Groningen field in 1959, which remains one of the largest gas fields in the world 
(Breunese, 2005). The discovery of this field was reported in trade journals following its 
mention in a European Parliamentary debate on energy policy in 1960 (Shepherd, 2015). 
Governments of countries bordering the North Sea started to be approached by major 
international oil companies for permission to begin exploration in their waters (Cabinet 
Papers, 1964). Within five years, the Government of the United Kingdom had ratified an 
agreement with all boarding states, most significantly including Norway, regarding maritime 
boundaries and it had under taken its first licensing round with generous offerings of offshore 
blocks to oil companies and itself.  Drilling in the North Sea had commenced in 1964, and by 
September of the following year British Petroleum (BP) announced the discovery of the West 
Sole gas field off the coast of Yorkshire (National Archives, 1970).  
By 1967 exploration of the North Sea began to move more centrally. Two years later 
Montrose, the first oil field in offshore British waters, was discovered by Amoco offshore 
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from Aberdeen (Shepherd, 2015). Shell had also made an oil discovery that year, on one of 
the Gannet fields, but their drilling had only penetrated the edge of the field and they were 
subsequently decidedly underwhelmed by their findings. Shortly following this, in October 
1970, BP discovered the largest oil field in the North Sea, the Forties field. This field came 
on-stream in September 1975, soon after the first oil production from the North Sea had 
commenced from the Argyll field, and by the turn of the century had produced over 2.5 
billion barrels of oil (Bamberg, 2000). The profits from the production of the Forties field 
were so great by the late 1970s, that one manager was to claim that at the tax levels then 
imposed BP would be able to buy most, if not all, of the declining British manufacturing 
industry (Shepherd, 2015). This was a particularly dramatic reversal in the stand point of the 
company, which had informed the Reuters news agency six months prior to the discovery, of 
scepticism over whether there was to be any oil found in their licensed blocks (BP, 2018).  
Exploration and drilling in the North Sea was an expensive venture, at a cost ten to twenty 
times greater than that of onshore operations (Shepherd, 2015). The decision to begin drilling 
in the North Sea had been made economically viable by the hike in fuel prices following the 
combined assault of conflict in the Middle East and domestic industrial action on the part of 
the coal miners (Noreng, 1980). The North Sea was at the time the region of earth with the 
harshest weather in which oil drilling would be attempted and special precautions had to be 
taken. For example, when platforms were brought into operation oil had to be collected by 
tankers from a radius of at least a mile away to prevent collision due to rough seas (BFI 
Database, 1977). Technology involved in the drilling of offshore oil had largely been 
developed in explorations of the Gulf of Mexico and would have to be adapted for use in the 
North Sea (Beckett, 2009). Decades later, Basil Butler of BP was to attest that it had been 
desperation to diversify away from the Middle East that had brought oil companies to the 
North Sea (Shepherd, 2015). Against the backdrop of British decolonisation and decline in 
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overseas military presence, as well as the rise in Arab nationalism and the perception of oil as 
a resource belonging to the state and its peoples, many oil companies rightly feared that their 
assets in these regions would be nationalised (Yergin, 1990). Whilst the development of 
North Sea oil might have seemed an economically attractive option to the British government 
and consumer, the move to this region might have principally been a hedge against political 
risk for most oil companies. Indeed, BP officials had gaped at the forecast that the Forties 
field would cost £370 million to develop. Little did they know at the time that the final bill 
would be multiples of this figure (Shepherd, 2015).  
In summary, a significant degree of uncertainty surrounded the North Sea in terms of the 
quantity of reserves, meaning that oil companies accepted considerable risk when they 
engaged in exploration and development of the region. The costs of development were 
unparalleled due to the particularly harsh climatic conditions and the depth of the oil reserves. 
However, due to the political uncertainty in regions with conditions more favourable to 
development, as well as the vast quantities of oil that ultimately were discovered, portfolio 
diversification into this region ultimately proved highly lucrative for companies able to 
generate sufficient capital to invest there. The next section will highlight the ways in which 
the government failed to optimise their policy with respect to the North Sea over a protracted 







3. A Sea of Lost Opportunity42  
i.The hasty division of the Continental Shelf (1964) 
Mismanagement of the develpment of North Sea oil arguably began before exploration was 
underway in earnest. John Liverman, who had been Deputy Secretary at the Department of 
Secretary and responsible for the North Sea oil and gas policy when Margaret Thatcher 
became Prime Minister in 1979, recalled some two decades later how she accusatorily asked 
him why he had let the Norwegians get away with it (Institute of Contemporary British 
History, 1999). The Prime Minister was referring to the agreement between Britain and 
Norway as to where the North Sea should be divided with respect to national sovereignty over 
the extraction and ownership of subsea resources, namely oil and gas. The maritime divide 
agreed with the Norwegians as part of the Continental Shelf Act (1965) was a median line 
between the two countries. What would be repeatedly highlighted following this decision was 
that the existing maritime laws were sufficiently open to interpretation as to have provided 
scope for British negotiation to extend their territory. Indeed, what both contemporary and 
current accounts suggest is that due to the definition of Continental Shelf that was used at the 
time, as well as the existence of a deep trench approximately 50 miles from the Norwegian 
coastline, it would have been possible to make a case for a lack of Norwegian claim to any 
part of the subsea resources within the North Sea.  
This avenue for extending the British domain of the North Sea was by no means an argument 
that had slipped the attention of those involved in the composition of the legislation. During 
discussions of the Continental Shelf Bill in the House of Lords on 3rd December 1964, Lord 
Shackleton, geographer and son of the famous British explorer Ernst Shackleton, remarked: 
‘…the continental shelf comes to an abrupt end about 50 miles, or a little more, off the coast 
                                               
42 In reference to the work by Norman J. Smith, The Sea of Lost Opportunity: North Sea Oil and Gas, British 
Industry and the Offshore Supplies Office 
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of Norway, and there is then a great deep. I should have thought that the British area extended 
right up to that deep, and that Norway, which none the less seems to have signed the 
Convention, would virtually have no continental shelf at all.’(Hansard Historic, 1964). Two 
weeks later, by 17th December, Lord Shackleton had changed his position, admitting he had 
been wrong in his previous interpretation. Following one further brief mention in the House 
of Commons on 28th January 1965, the issue seemed to be dropped entirely (Hansard Historic, 
1965). 
The decision on the part of the British to so easily relinquish any further claims to the North 
Sea was met with surprise by external contemporary observers, as well as being a cause of 
disquiet amongst domestic politicians. For example, a U.S. intelligence report, published on 
14th June 1974 remarked that ‘The distinguishing feature of the agreement between Norway 
and the United Kingdom is that the deep Norwegian Trench was ignored in the determination 
of the CSB. If the coastal 100-fathom contour had been used in delimiting the Norwegian 
claim to the continental shelf, their claim would have been virtually non-existent…’ (The 
Geographer, 1974 p.5). Meanwhile, it has retrospectively been explained both as a tactical 
manoeuvre by the British government to avoid negotiations that could delay the extraction of 
oil from the region, as well as a means of appeasing the Norwegians (Shepherd, 2015). 
Nonetheless, James Allcock, former senior executive of the British Gas Corporation, claimed 
that the Norwegians themselves were astonished by the concession. Whilst the exact 
unfolding of the decision to bypass further negotiations remains to be fully detailed, it would 
seem likely that it was concern amongst those in the cabinet not to delay development of a 
valuable resource that fast-tracked the process. Indeed, there was a degree of alarm in the 
House of Lords in December 1964 due to the bill in question not following the regular 
procedures, seemingly allowing less time for readings and discussion of the terms than 
customary (Hansard Historic, 1964). It would appear that the British administration had 
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determined that such a delay as negotiations would entail was not one the economy could 
afford.  
ii. The mistakes of administration: licensing and tax revenues (1964-1975) 
Beyond the negotiations and diplomacy involved in securing an agreement with a fellow 
sovereign nation, the British are believed to have mismanaged North Sea resources in their 
unpreparedness for dealings with multinational oil firms. With respect to this domain the 
criticisms are twofold. The first realm of discontent concerns the licensing terms for 
exploration in the North Sea. Up until the financial crisis in 1976 there had been four 
licensing rounds. The first had been in 1964, followed by the second in 1965. After a few 
years the third followed in 1970 and a fourth in 1971/2 (Oil and Gas Authority, 2018). A key 
figure in these licensing rounds was Angus Beckett, the undersecretary of the Petroleum 
Division of the Ministry of Power. He became the focal point of reproach from Liberals and 
leftists who claimed that the government had granted over-lenient terms to major oil 
companies, including the licensing term of up to 46 years. In a review of the process in 1972, 
the House Committee of Public Accounts had likened Britain to a ‘gullible sheikdom’. 
National interests were thought to have been pushed aside by the sharper-pointed capitalist 
elbows of multinational companies. British national industries had gained a mere twelve per 
cent of concessions, whilst inclusion of private national firms increased this figure to thirty 
per cent. ‘All the producing oil fields in the North Sea were licensed by Angus’, recalled 
Richard Funkhouser, an American diplomat and geologist who had known him. In response to 
the casting of blame for the betrayal of national interest he further remarked ‘a monument 
should and would be erected to him for saving Britain from the disaster that would have hit, 
without the oil lifeline which he personally produced when at the Department of Energy’ 
(Harvie, 1994 p. 85). Such a comment served not only to underscore Beckett’s centrality to 
proceedings, but also emphasise the extent to which the haste to begin development of the 
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North Sea might have led to oversight in introducing more measured licensing arrangements 
for the first four rounds.  
Beyond this, the second domain of criticism was the degree to which the government failed to 
adequately tax profits made by these firms from North Sea oil. Such firms seemed to 
systematically underestimate the reserves of the North Sea, whilst simultaneously 
emphasising the singular challenge of climatic conditions so as to make it appear that they 
were doing the British people a favour by agreeing to explore the region. Once the extent of 
potential profits became apparent following the discovery of oilfields such as the Forties, 
public outrage commenced over the leniency of taxation on these firms. ‘Between 1965 and 
1973 the oil majors’ corporation taxation liability in the UK was £500,000,’ reported the 
Public Accounts Committee in 1972. ‘It is hard to believe that the profits made did not 
warrant a higher tax payment,’ it continued, echoing popular sentiment (Public Accounts, 
1973 p.12).  
iii. Failure to develop the Offshore Supply industry (1958-73) 
No less was the government criticised for its ineptitude in administering North Sea oil such as 
to maximise tax revenues than it was lambasted for not sufficiently investing in the 
development of an offshore supply industry. The lethargy with which the British government 
responded to the realisation that oil extraction would require a corollary industry to support 
the process through the provision of supplies such as rigs, platforms and vessels has been 
minutely chronicled by those such as Norman J. Smith (2011). His account highlights how the 
government were delayed in introducing policies that would help direct orders for offshore 
supplies toward British industry. For example, the Offshores Supplies Office was established 
only in 1973 with the aim of encouraging upwards of 70 per cent of such orders to be placed 
with national firms. Two years later, when the Department of Energy first published statistics 
on this industry it was evident that this figure was far below this at approximately 52 per cent. 
 18 
The majority of offshore supplies were thus not constructed in British dock yards, but 
imported, principally from the Americans and the Dutch. Commentators point out that despite 
having no experience with the oil industry, or reserves to itself exploit, France was much 
more agile in responding to the forecast needs of exploration and production companies 
(Smith, 2011). Meanwhile the British, despite a legacy of close affiliation with two major oil 
companies, let pass by an opportunity of exceptional magnitude for their industrial sector. 
Furthermore, importing offshore supplies had a significant impact on the balance of 
payments. Indeed, capital expenditure on North Sea oil development peaked in 1976, the year 
of the financial crisis, which accounted for 80 per cent of United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
(UKCS) expenditure (Harvie, 1994). This amounted to £1.2 billion worth of imports, at a time 
that could scarcely be more burdensome. 
iv. The absence of an oil fund (1974-2018) 
The legacy of an opportunity missed might sit more comfortably with British collective 
memory had the revenue of oil production been seen to be spent more astutely. It has been 
observed that by the 1980s the government was no longer plagued with concerns over the 
balance of payments due to the impact of oil revenues, an observation cynically followed by 
the analysis that this money was being squandered on increased imports and unemployment 
benefits. The mismanagement of North Sea oil revenue became a point of contention in 
particular due to claims by the Scottish National Party that the oil of the North Sea was a 
national asset of the Scottish people and provided an economic basis for their claim to 
independence. The party itself seemed to adopt this line of argument relatively late in the 
development of the North Sea, whilst by 1977 one survey found that only 13 per cent of the 
party’s supporters were aware of this policy. Nonetheless, it was a point which came to be 
avidly debated in Westminster as the English were loath to relinquish control of these assets, 
and thus were compelled to find ways in which to contain the campaign for devolution such 
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that it did not infringe on their prerogative of oil extraction (Beckett, 2009). That the 
government determined not to make an oil fund was a point continuously resurrected both by 
ongoing political movements seeking Scottish independence, and by comparisons with the 
Norwegians, who having invested their North Sea oil revenues now boast one of the largest 
sovereign wealth fund in the world (Kern, 2007). Ahead of the referendum on Scottish 
independence in 2014 attention was once more drawn to the lack of an oil fund and the fact 
that revenues had not been spent on investing in local areas involved in the oil industry, such 
as Aberdeen, but had by and large been appropriated by London (The Scottish Government, 
2013). Meanwhile, in 2018 the Institute for Public Policy Research concluded that had the 
UK developed a sovereign wealth fund in tandem with authorities in Oslo, it would now be 
worth around £500 billion (Robert’s and Lawrence, 2018). Larry Elliott (2017) commented 
‘…creating a sovereign wealth fund would involve deferred gratification. That’s not how we 
do things in Britain’, encapsulating lack of control over the British appetite for near-term 
spending in preference to long-term investment. To add insult to injury, Scottish Nationals are 
unlikely to let rest the belief that the money Westminster frittered away had not been theirs to 
spend in the first place.  
Throughout the development of North Sea oil, oversights were made by successive 
governments, in part associated with concern for the British economic condition. North Sea 
oil was developed with a considerable degree of haste, as exhibited by the failure of the 
Government to negotiate with Norway for further territory and significant secession of 
acreage during the first four licensing rounds. There was a limited degree of planning in 
policy-making but rather it seemed to develop on an ad-hoc basis as errors became evident. In 
part, this may have related to the nature of the asset: given uncertainty over the quantity of 
reserves it was difficult to assess their value or implications for the economy. Nonetheless, it 
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can be said with a degree of confidence that these would have been greater had policy-makers 
been more cautious and conscientious.  
 
4. Control and Co-operation in the North Sea 
 
i.The fifth licensing round and BNOC 
The Labour administration had important decisions to make regarding one of their largest 
domains of investment in 1976: the development of North Sea oil. The fifth offshore licensing 
round, and the first to take place under a Labour government, was scheduled for the end of the 
year. The Left had ardently criticised the form of the previous four rounds, whereby they 
alleged that the North Sea had haplessly been portioned out under the clumsy vigilance of the 
Tories (Harvie, 1994). Thus, they were adamant that they would run a more measured and 
sustainable process. The determination to do so had to be balanced against some of the more 
grandiose promises made in Wilson’s General Election Manifesto (1974). Given the impact of 
the oil crisis in the country, it was felt at the time that the British public would show a 
preference for greater state control over North Sea oil. The manifesto thus proposed the 
establishment of the British National Oil Company (BNOC), which would defend the national 
interest through measures such as majority participation in every new licence in the North 
Sea, and negotiations on all formerly issued licences. The critical decision to be negotiated at 
the time of the financial crisis was the definition of what majority participation would 
constitute in the licensing round they claimed would shape the ongoing credibility of the 
British government in North Sea oil development.  
In terms of proportion, BNOC would make claim to the minimum percentage necessary to 
establish majority participation, namely 51%. However, the British government had uniquely 
decided that this would mean that BNOC would fund an equitable contribution to partners in 
licensed blocks in terms of exploration and development (Hansard Historic, 1976b). The issue 
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most keenly debated within Cabinet in this regard in the Summer of 1976 was whether this 
commitment would be financed as these processes were underway, or whether the payments 
would be deferred until they could be compensated from revenues (Cabinet Papers, 1976). 
Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, proposed that financial commitment from the 
outset was needed to ensure that the fifth licensing round was attractive to investors and thus 
a success. He believed that ‘If the Corporation refused to put in its share of the costs, it would 
become simply a sleeping partner, and its credibility as a State oil company would be 
destroyed. By taking a financial stake on the other hand, it would get all the information it 
needed and in addition would be able to influence the placing of orders with the supplying 
industry,’ as recorded in the Cabinet Papers from 5th May 1976. The argument put forth for 
contemporaneous investment was that initial exploration costs were forecasted  as being low, 
amounting to £12 million between 1976-1979. Even if BNOC did not contribute, much of this 
cost would be refunded by the government to private enterprises due to tax conditions that 
had been crafted to encourage investment in the area.  
This financial argument was countered by the Treasury in two respects. First was that such a 
comparatively small investment would therefore not give much status to the firm in any case. 
Secondly, that the negotiation of participation by BNOC in pre-existing licenses in the 
absence of financial contribution had not prevented the agreement of satisfactory terms for the 
Corporation. However, the critical issue was not so much exploration costs as development 
costs, which would dwarf the former by comparison. Furthermore, the concern of the Cabinet 
was that funding for BNOC would be accounted for in the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement, which was currently under intense scrutiny due to negotiations with the IMF for 
standby credit. In the same cabinet paper, the Chief Secretary of the Treasury ‘agreed it was 
unfortunate that borrowing abroad by BNOC scored as part of the public sector borrowing 
requirement, but it would be impossible to change the existing conventions until the country’s 
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financial position as a whole was stronger. If the Government gave the impression at the 
present it would be ready to contribute their share of the huge costs which would eventually 
arise on development, as they arose, the knowledge of these potential obligations would 
create very serious problems for Britain’s credit abroad.’ In other words, due to the 
observance of British public expenditure, particularly the borrowing requirement, it was 
possible neither to alter the accounting methodology such that BNOC’s capital expenditure 
was not recorded under this classification, nor was it possible to make substantial 
commitments to future spending without causing alarm and possible further devaluation of 
sterling. The compromise reached by the Cabinet was that BNOC would broadly engage in 
exploration costs and consider participation in development finance on a case by case basis. 
What this constituted was a significant betrayal of the principles set out in the Labour 
manifesto of 1974 and the foundation of the pathway toward the political Right in the 
management of North Sea oil.  
ii. Sale of BP Shares 
A second accident of accounting with significant repercussions for the future management of 
Britain’s North Sea oil management was how the sale of British Petroleum stock was 
recorded in National Accounts. In the final agreement reached with the IMF for the loan in 
December 1976, the British government had outlined public expenditure cuts of £1 billion 
and further proposed the sale of £500 million in their holding of shares in BP, amounting to 
17% of the company, as described in the Cabinet Papers from 13th December 1976. By 1976, 
the State had come to hold 68% of BP. This had been both the result of their historic interest 
in the company, and events that transpired in the wake of the oil crisis. Burmah Oil Ltd., a 
Scottish enterprise holding a 20.5% interest in BP had reached near bankruptcy as a result of 
declines in profit and a slump in BP stock price, which had served as collateral against 
multiple loans it had taken out. Since BP’s stock price had in part fallen due to their 
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commitments in the North Sea and Alaska, as well as general lows in the British stock 
market, the Bank of England had stepped in to guarantee £300 million of Burmah’s loans, to 
prevent a loss of confidence in the North Sea oil project. In doing so it had gained control 
over Burmah’s stake in BP (Harvie, 1994). As described in the Cabinet Papers from 7th 
December 1976, the government had thus planned to retain a 51% holding in BP and sell the 
additional 17% it had gained from Burmah. Although there had been a number of scandals 
implicating BP over the course of the year, drawing renewed attention to the government’s 
relationship with the firm, the decisive issue was that the sale would qualify as negative 
public expenditure, and therefore go some way toward compromising with the IMF on the 
issue of higher expenditure cuts. In truth, the sale of BP stock was a one-time measure, with 
no significant consequence for the trajectory of the British public expenditure in the long-
term. However, acceptance by the IMF legitimised the presentation of the sale of public assets 
as negative expenditure (Feigenbaum, 1998). 
After the announcement of the agreement with the IMF over the terms for the loan, the value 
of sterling recovered, and remained relatively stable for the course of 1977. It was almost as 
though the market had forgotten the issue of the sale of BP stock, which eventually took place 
in July 1977 (New York Times Archives, 1977). Although seemingly unnecessary at that 
point, the government were concerned that they should not appear to be reneging on the terms 
set out in their agreement with the IMF, for fear of disturbing market confidence in the 
fulfilment of their more substantive concessions, as outlined in the Cabinet Papers from 11th 
March 1977. In this document it was further observed, that since the government holding was 
accidentally, rather than strategically, at 68%, the sale of 17% of the stock would be a 
relatively painless way to meet targets for 1977-8 expenditure cuts. Although it was briefly 
suggested that the shares could be kept in the public domain via the establishment of a State-
owned holding company, this option was discarded as soon as it was noted ‘the money raised 
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by any company in the public sector would count as part of the financing of the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement; it would not reduce it.’ The government were thus cornered into the 
first significant privatisation in the British oil industry, which would escalate in the next seven 
years to include the full privatisation of BNOC’s operations. Unwittingly, the Labour 
administration had taken decisions that would set precedents for future Thatcherite policies, 
which represented the antithesis of their fundamental beliefs. The financial crisis, and the 
observance of the international community of their public expenditure had forced decisions 
that from a superficial perspective might have seemed relatively inconsequential, yet 
contextually represent the swinging of the pendulum from the ideals of one extreme, to the 
reality of another.  
Whilst the financial crisis and the necessity of complying with external expectations thus had 
an effect on long-term domestic policy with respect to North Sea oil development, an analysis 
of the policy developments in the North Sea reveals a more fundamental issue. Although the 
financial crisis meant that in the short-term the British government were constrained in their 
decision-making, arguably both the financial crisis and subsequent policy judgements were 
the result of political fracture and disruption. This fracture made itself evident on multiple 
plains. However, two will be highlighted for the purposes of illustrating the tensions caused in 
orchestrating North Sea oil development.  
iii. Tony Benn, contrarian and Secretary of State for Energy 
The first was that between the Labour party itself, which following its defeat in 1979 would 
dissolve into a leadership contest. In 1981 the Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, led 
an unsuccessful campaign against incumbent Deputy Leader, Denis Healey, formerly 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Healey, 2015). Tony Benn represented the far Left in the 
Labour party, and others within the party had previously sought to restrain his political 
progress and influence (Pimlott, 2016). His appointment to the Department of Energy had in 
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fact constituted a demotion, hoped to contain his more radical sentiments. During the 
financial crisis in 1976 he had championed the ‘alternative strategy’ of protectionist import 
duties, which were rebuffed by the centrist core in favour negotiating a loan with the IMF 
(Wickham-Jones, 1996). His seemingly outlandish suggestions at the time of the crisis caused 
difficulty in ability to convince others of his more far-sighted measures in the domain of 
energy policy. Whilst he was successful in drastically reducing the number of blocks offered 
by the government in the fifth and sixth offshore licensing round his influence was short-lived 
(Oil and Gas Authority, 2018). His policy in preference of controlled depletion via the 
cautious licensing of smaller portions of the North Sea paralleled the strategy adopted by the 
Norwegians (Harvie,1994). Nonetheless, he proved unable to introduce sustained change in 
policy. Furthermore, despite begrudgingly accepting the sale of BP assets, he once more 
demonstrated his percipient judgement when writing:  ‘We have handed some of the most 
valuable assets of this country to the Shah to the Americans and to private shareholders, and I 
am ashamed to be a member of the Cabinet that has done this...We have provided a blueprint 
for selling off public assets in the future and we will have no argument against it. It is an 
outrage …’(Benn, 2017 p.112). Lamentably, this was a private rather than public reflection.  
Perhaps the policy he supported that was most regrettably not carried through was that of the 
creation of an oil fund. Although in 1974 all parties seemed to support the notion of the 
development of a North Sea oil fund, when discussions were held amongst the Cabinet in 
February 1978 after two years of debate, Tony Benn seemed in isolation to defend the idea of 
a separate fund for North Sea oil revenue as illustrated by the Cabinet record from 16th 
February 1978. By a large majority in the Cabinet it was decided there should be no separate 
fund created. The proceeds of the North Sea oil were to be spent on increased general public 
expenditure and tax cuts.  
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iv. Discontent of the Scottish Nationals 
In this Cabinet paper from 16th February 1978 it was further observed that the idea of creating 
an oil fund ‘would [have] be particularly welcome to Scottish opinion. Other political parties 
had virtually committed themselves to the establishment of a special Scottish oil fund.’ 
Throughout 1976, Parliament simultaneously engaged in debates over the devolution of 
power to Scotland, to establish limited independent legislative authority in the nation, as well 
as entirely disregarding any claim made by Scotland to having national sovereignty over 
North Sea assets, which fell within what would have been classified as their territorial waters. 
‘The boundary drawn for the purpose of defining the Scottish and English jurisdiction areas 
on the Continental Shelf is not relevant to the attribution of reserves,’ was typical of the reply 
from Westminster to the suggestion that Scotland might have any sort of independent claim to 
the oil reserves adjacent to their border (Hansard Historic, 1976c). The notion of a boundary 
was unthinkable to Parliament given that the majority of reserves would have then had to be 
relinquished to Scotland, and recovery of the financial situation depended in no small part on 
the perception that the government would shortly have access to significant revenue increases 
from North Sea oil production. However, suffocation of Scottish national interests ultimately 
proved to be the downfall of the Callaghan government. As a minority in Parliament, Labour 
relied on the support they received from the Scottish National Party, which was rapidly 
withdrawn in 1979 after the referendum on the devolution of powers was unsuccessful. 
Although 51.6% voted in favour of devolution, only 64% of the electorate voted, in this way 
falling to meet the effective support threshold of 40% of the population needed to pass the 
resolution (Harvie, 1994). The Scottish once again felt they had been cheated by London. The 
tragedy was that recognition of Scottish interests with respect to the North Sea oil might have 
resulted in both more astute management of revenues and prevented the demise of the last 
Labour administration for almost two decades. 
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As opposed to the effect of protracted economic turbulence in leading to leniency and 
oversight in policy governing North Sea oil development, the condition of the financial crisis 
reduced activity and prompted a minute oversight of the assets and financing of the region. 
Manipulations to the trajectory of North Sea oil were made, which at first were merely marks 
on a balance sheet: The Cabinet scratched out BNOC capital expenditure development costs 
and £500 million in BP shares to appease the IMF and financial markets who were less 
interested in the details than they were in a palatable PSBR figure. Nonetheless, these 
decisions would ultimately contribute to the rapid retreat of the state from the vision of public 
participation and control over the North Sea.  
 
Conclusion 
The argument that Britain mismanaged its North Sea oil resources is not by any means 
mainstream, in part because consideration of the development of the North Sea from a 
macroeconomic perspective has not been the focus of extensive research inquiry. This work 
has sought to synthesise the arguments that do exist from disparate sources to show how 
protracted problems with the post-war economy influenced the lack of negotiation over the 
extent of the continental shelf, the naïve  nature of early licensing rounds, the failure of the 
British government to adequately tax multinational enterprises, and the opportunities missed 
in the offshore service industry and establishment of an oil fund. The key revelation as to the 
investigation over how the financial crisis affected the development of North Sea oil was how 
international attention to the process of public expenditure accounting led to two seemingly 
harmless policy decisions, which came to have significant repercussions in the long-term. 
This included the inability to commit the national oil company to the development costs of 
licensed blocks it would supposedly have a majority participation in, undermining it from the 
outset. It further set a precedent in terms of how the privatisation of oil assets could qualify as 
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negative public expenditure, which ultimately became the intended fate of national oil 
company as soon as the Thatcher administration came to office. However, it would appear 
that the broader theme contributing to both the origins of the financial crisis and the 
mismanagement of North Sea oil was the issue of political division. This turmoil caused a 
pervasive sense of uncertainty and elicited a crisis of confidence as to the direction of British 
economic development and political leanings.  This was fundamentally at the core of the 
financial crisis, and the decisions taken by Labour that distanced it from its traditional stance. 
In many ways the oil crisis of 1973-4 opened up a brief window of opportunity whereby 
popular desire for public control over and cautious management of North Sea oil resources 
was particularly acute. However, this window was shattered by the internal fissures between 
those governing at the time. By the time these had been repaired and reformed, it was too late 
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